Introduction
Institutions, policies and approaches towards flood risk management (FRM) in the UK have undergone a substantive transition over the past 50 years or more, affecting the dominant philosophy, the type of risk reduction measures, and the implementation strategies (Tunstall, Johnson & Penning-Rowsell, 2004) . This transition has been characterised into three key phases and phrases: 'land drainage', 'flood defence' and, more recently, 'flood risk management' -each of which reflect a fundamental shift in the dominant beliefs, values and attitudes of society towards the flood problem (Johnson, Tunstall & Penning-Rowsell, 2005; Tunstall et al., 2004) . Research has also examined the impact of flood crises as creating 'windows of opportunity' for promoting and fostering policy change (Penning-Rowsell, Johnson & Tunstall, 2006) .
In this paper, the theorising shifts away from the catalytic role of the flood itself -or other crises -towards a deeper understanding of the relationship between change and stability, taking the example of flood insurance, its agreements, policy approaches and the actors involved: the insurers and the government (Defra; HM Treasury). We examine flood insurance both because it is an important FRM measure in the UK and because an overview of this field over the past 50 years would suggest many years of relatively unusual policy stability. It is also notable in that the private sector is centrestage -profit driven insurance companies -and therefore it differs markedly from most other measures in FRM which are in the public domain. As we shall see, this profoundly affects outcomes because a major factor continues to be assuring the profitability of the private companies involved, not least to ensure that the government is spared the obligation and burden of a scheme of national flood compensation.
Our research should be seen in its international context. There is a wealth of literature about the different current and past flood insurance models and their effectiveness (including CEA, 2005; CCS, 2008; Fiselier & Oosterberg, 2004; Gaschen, Hausmann, Menzinger & Schaad, 1998; Lamond & Penning-Rowsell, 2011) , highlighting the relative uniqueness of the UK flood insurance model, with its private market basis and little direct government intervention. These reviews also show that insurance (and compensation) arrangements in other European countries, for example, have undergone many recent and fundamental reforms (e.g. Belgium in 2003/5; Denmark 2000; France 1982; The Netherlands 2000) and that the US NFIP has only been in its current guise for some 35 years (Lehrer, 2008; Michel-Kerjan, 2010 ).
In the paper we therefore seek to understand the UK arrangements, and its special character, not least to show how it may not be a model for imitation elsewhere, owing to its unique history. We do this by first outlining our methodology and important limitations, and the classic theories concerning policy evolution. We then catalogue the many stages of flood insurance policy and practice since the 1960s, and seek to discuss this empirical material in the general context of the theories that frame our analysis. We briefly conclude with some comments about the value for this policy area of the policy change theories we have described, and some suggestions as to how the situation might evolve in the future given the many forecasts of greater flood risk as a result of climate change.
Methods and Limitations
This research relies upon in-depth analysis of the policy agreements governing flood insurance since the 1960s (ABI, 2001; 2002; 2008; BIA/FOC 1961; Defra, 2013a) in the context of other FRM policy decisions which may have influenced the provision of flood insurance (e.g. Defra, 2005) . We also draw upon Parliamentary and professional debates about flood insurance, to illuminate the several drivers for policy stability or change. An integrated policy analysis approach has been adopted which combines both a retrospective and prospective analysis of policy decisions (Dunn, 2004) , permitting comment on how previous policy evolution and decisions may impact on future flood insurance provision.
But methodologically this field is far from easy: in many instances it is simply not possible to understand fully the pattern of drivers and events. This is partly because 'commercial sensitivities' abound in the insurance industry -whether real or invented.
Policy evolution here has been as a result of repeated periods of intense negotiation between the key players, most of which has been 'behind closed doors' with little written evidence remaining. Briefings to Minsters are also unavailable and government motives appear even less easy to fathom here from their public pronouncements than in other areas. Also, the incremental policy changes that we are investigating are much more hidden than catalytic changes, which are often well publicised. The forces that inhibit change -or promote no-change -are often deep seated within society and difficult to pinpoint and analyse: when there is no change, or very little change, this can be difficult to explain.
To seek to remedy this situation, empirical data have been gathered through indepth semi-structured interviews with six current or ex-flood insurance professionals many of whom represented the insurance industry from 2000 to today (Table 1) 1 . Each interview was transcribed and analysed using a systematic process of open and selective coding adopting a grounded theory approach to data analysis (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) .
We have thereby explored, as far as possible, the content, processes and power relations within these negotiations to better understand the key drivers involved and complement the documented formal policy agreements and associated published material. Often, however, even these interviewees only had hypotheses about the cause of slow policy evolution, or periods of apparent change, rather than unambiguous information. Table 1 should be inserted about here
Given these methodological difficulties, we are careful here not to 'overinterpret' the evidence that we have collected, and anticipate that this paper provides only a first step in unpicking the hidden but important world of flood insurance. As time passes some of the negotiation processes may become less contentious and clearer, and that is an area for future research.
Conceptualising policy change and stability
We seek here to understand the slow and incremental evolution of FRM policy though an understanding of change itself.
In this regard the policy science literature is awash with theories on how and why policy changes in certain contexts but is highly resistant to change in others (Birkland, 2005) : we briefly review these ideas here. A common strand is that policy subsystems are inherently resistant to change. The classic theories are that any significant change requires either an external shock or catalyst (Johnson et al., 2005; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993) , or a combination of external pressures resulting in 'large leaps' such that the status quo becomes 'punctuated' (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993) , or a 'window of opportunity' opens to connect successfully two or more components of the policy stream (Kingdon, 1995) . Stability, conversely, implies that these change agents are weak or non-existent; hence their failure to facilitate change during the brief timeframe within which any 'window of opportunity' remains open. Stachowiak (2011) has identified three more theories that also raise questions regarding policy stability (Table 2 ). In challenging rational choice theory, Tversky and Kahneman's (1981) 'Prospect theory' is useful in arguing that change depends on how options are framed and presented. 'Political Elite' theory is valuable in that, drawing on the sociology of power relations, it focuses on influence concentrated in the hands of a few individuals (Domhoff, 1990; Wright Mills, 2000) . And, finally, from social psychology, 'Grassroots theory' shows how community organisations can create power and, through mutual action, achieve change (Alinsky, 1989; Biklen, 1983) . (John 1998) ? In this research we drew on this classical political science literature to provide a framework from which such questions can be asked of the flood insurance policy subsystem.
If policy stability appears abnormal in FRM, this is counterintuitive to most theorists of policy change, who argue that under 'normal conditions' policies are indeed relatively stable. Where it is in the interest of powerful elites (Wright Mills, 2000) , advocacy groups (Sabatier, 1999; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1993) , actor networks (Marsh & Rhodes, 1992) or policy communities, a set of shared core beliefs and values result in a common understanding of the policy domain, the main policy problems, and the desirability and feasibility of different policy options (Huitema & Meijerink, 2009 ).
These groups resist change, creating a policy equilibrium (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993) , serving thereby to further enhance their individual and collective interest and power in the strategic manipulation of the policy process.
For some observers, however, policy stability is a result of inherent barriers to change -dominated by ideological values and beliefs, institutional constraints, the ingrained nature of public policy decision processes and the inadequacies of policy implementation (Bachrach & Baratz, 1970) . For others there is active defence of the status quo by the power elites (Wright Mills, 2000) . From this perspective, policy subsystems are continually being created and destroyed by negative feedback. Only during times of positive feedback can issues be redefined and a new stability created (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993 For flood insurance arrangements, it is these differing processes of change that we examine here, to seek to understand the relative policy stability that we observe.
The evolution of UK flood insurance arrangements
Flood insurance pre-1961 and the 'Gentleman's Agreement'
Flood insurance is one of the cornerstones of UK FRM, and has been available for domestic properties in the United Kingdom for over 90 years (Table 3) , becoming part of composite policies in 1922. The take-up was reported to be relatively low initially, a likely combination of the lack of product awareness, other priorities on domestic budgets, and the lack of large scale floods before 1947 to demonstrate need (Arnell, Clark and Gurnell, 1984) . (Arnell et al., 1984) -raised concerns that providing compensation would become the norm and would be unaffordable (House of Commons, 1961) . Insurance industry concerns that the government was about to impose additional regulations on insurers and the creation of a National
Disaster Fund (Arnell et al., 1984) This agreement formed the foundation for flood insurance for the next 40 years:
universally available cover and by default the creation of a cross-subsidy to the at-risk from the risk-free (in that every householder was charged for flood cover, irrespective of risk). It was not, however, immediately successful in increasing penetration and reducing the exposure of government and local authorities to providing ex-gratia compensation payments. Although the rationale behind the agreement was to provide the "assurance that Flood Cover will be available to everyone, including the 'small man'" (BIA/FOC, 1961, p. 5) one of the Agreement's key phrases was that insurance was available "on request". In reality, consumers were not asking for flood insurance cover to be added to their policies, and flooding in 1965 and 1968 showed that penetration had not increased significantly since the agreement (Arnell et al., 1984) .
This was recognised to be owing to a lack of awareness of the availability of cover (Interviewee 1, 6) and, in 1969, a publicity campaign was mounted by both the BIA and the UK Government with, for example, leaflets enclosed with all fire insurance renewals. Local authorities also sought to raise insurance awareness with their tenants and, from the 1970s onwards, the Building Societies Association began making flood insurance cover mandatory for all of their mortgage business.
Although the Gentleman's Agreement's aim was to increase insurance penetration and "get some extra value out of insurance" (Interviewee 1), flood insurance was not universal. Those at high risk were meant to pay a modest increase in premium and the Agreement allowed those at the very highest risk to be excluded. Despite these notable provisions, the situation in reality in the following 40 years was that flood insurance was considered to be universally available and there was very little pricing difference between high and low risk properties. Penetration greatly increased during this period, particularly for buildings cover owing to the mortgage requirement, and flood insurance began being offered for commercial properties.
Post-2000 and the 'Statement(s) of Principles'
On the 20 th February 2001 the ABI issued a Memorandum to the UK government which heralded a period of apparent policy change. This was the first of a suite of formal policy agreements setting out commitments on both sides: "The general policy of (ABI) members will be to maintain cover for a minimum of two years for domestic properties and small businesses…which already had cover" (ABI, 2001, p. 1). The express purpose of the agreement -actually remarkably similar to the 'Gentleman's Agreement'
-was "to prevent Government intervention in underwriting policy and widespread criticism of the industry" (Interviewee 5).
This was perhaps the beginning of a shift in power relations as evidenced by insurers beginning to increase the pressure on UK Government to take a stronger lead in FRM and improve their levels of investment. The insurers now occupied a stronger position following the favourable reception of their performance after the 1998 and 2000 floods, in contract to widespread criticism of the Environment Agency's flood warnings in 1998 (Bye & Horner, 1998) and of spatial planning in 2000 (Johnson et al., 2005) . Maintaining cover responded to media concern at the time that many flooded households would find policy renewal difficult following the widespread 2000 event (Environment Agency, 2001 ). However, our interviewees suggested there was also increasing pressure from the Government, with an implicit threat that "if the industry did not respond helpfully then the Government was going to make life a bit difficult for them" (Interviewee 2). Little comment was made publicly but during negotiations it was apparently made clear that unless some agreement was reached the situation might become "politically difficult for insurers" (Interviewee 2). The Memorandum was seen by the ABI as a "'band aid… to stop the debate rushing off into unhelpful territory" (Interviewee 2) and to give time for them to enable them to reposition themselves. In 2013 a new 'understanding' was reached that seeks to replace the current 'Statement of Principles', after protracted negotiations from 2011 to 2013 between the government and the ABI: "Getting to this stage has required compromise by both sides" (Thoresen, 2013, p. 1) 3 . The proposal if confirmed will, from 2015, establish an arrangement to set an upper limit to flood insurance premiums (rendering them supposedly "affordable"), linking these to local Council Tax bands so that householders will know the maximum they will have to pay and those in the larger properties will pay more. To fund the continuation of the cross-subsidy from those at low risk to those at high risk that this entails, a new and compulsory industry-backed levy will enable insurance companies to fund a not-for-profit 'pool' (termed Flood-Re), at the rate of £180m per annum, to cover claims from those 500,000 households with premiums above certain "eligibility thresholds". As these compulsory payments are in effect a tax, and the arrangement brings at least some state liability, legislation will require all UK household insurers to pay into this pool, at an estimated average annual rate of £10.50
per household (from within the existing insurers' revenue). The arrangement is seen as a transitional one: "while a gradual move to risk-reflective pricing in the longer-term would create additional incentives to reduce the likelihood and the cost of flooding"
(Defra, 2013a; p. 14) "…successful implementation (of the agreement) would entail insurance terms adjusting towards risk-reflective pricing at a pace that allows choices to be made by policyholders facing long-term increases in insurance costs … and avoids any risk of instability in insurance, mortgage and local housing markets" (Defra, 2013b, p. 1). So the era of relatively informal agreements is likely to be over, and the full force of the law will be used to support the new scheme. The proposals in 2013 appear fundamental, and have been described as such ("a step-change better than the Statement of Principles" (Defra, 2013a, p. 6)), but we see them as only marginal changes to the system that has existed since the 1960s: a formalisation of the previous cross-subsidy system with a continuation of universally available flood cover provided by private insurance companies.
Discussion
In interpreting the steady evolution of agreements and policy for flood insurance in relation to the classic theories of policy change briefly discussed above, we seek here to answer some questions in three areas related to the change theorising above:
understanding the policy domain; understanding the policy subsystem: actors, coalitions and entrepreneurs; 'windows' for policy change and/or policy stability in flood insurance. These are tackled below in turn.
The changing context for the policy domain
Our questions here are, in relation to last 50 years, how important has been the wider context and hence external pressures in affecting the flood insurance domain and its policy; why has change not be more fundamental given so many other societal changes over this time?
In response, we can see relatively few changes of flood insurance institutional structures and governance arrangements; these are driven by market forces as much as by policy and, in general, markets change slowly over time. But there have been a number of significant changes within the insurance market over the period of the Statement(s) of Principles, which have impacted on insurance provision. Each represents a progressive tightening of the competitive environment.
First, the deregulation of building societies (Deregulation (Building Societies)
Order 1995) meant that they were now able to write business and contents insurance. One insurance professional we interviewed argued that premiums are also not increasing quickly enough to reflect the risk (a finding supported by Ball, Werritty, & Geddes, 2013) , for what the interviewee considered to be mainly reputational reasons.
In a competitive market many insurers want to limit premium increases per renewal and therefore re-rating is taking a long time for high risk properties. Other insurers are avoiding substantially raising household premiums due to concern about how the damage to their reputation may affect other areas of their business such as motor cover (Interviewee 5). Insurers have been looking for solutions whereby they would not need to increase premiums beyond a certain level -i.e. a mechanism to deal with the highest risk and avoid affordability issues -or a solution that would give them an excuse to raise premiums along with the rest of the market. Concern about this under-pricing has risen greatly as awareness of flood risk and the extent of under-pricing and therefore insurers' exposure has become clear (ABI, 2010) . It is this gradual advancement in risk assessment understanding that has, according to our insurance professionals, been the main driver of policy change.
Many aspects of contextual change have therefore led to the slow evolution that we describe: changing market conditions; technological advancements; and reputational concerns. Many of the characteristics of the situation six decades ago continue to this day and appear liable to continue into the future. The external pressures were not such as to create the classic "large leaps" (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993) ; they were strong, pervasive but not sudden. Fundamentally there are two main 'sides' to the flood insurance issue -the insurers and the government (including Defra; Treasury). Viewed in this way the actors have remained fairly stable over the last 50 years. In terms of elites (Wright Mills, 2000) the ABI is the public face of the private insurance industry, which is backed by heavyweight capital interests, but it is only as strong as its members will give it support;
The policy subsystem: actors, coalitions and entrepreneurs

Several
and this is not guaranteed -although divisions are rarely made public owing to reputational risks. The insurance industry as a whole is extremely powerful within British society -although again largely hidden from view -because it earns very large amounts of foreign exchange at a time of chronic imbalances in payments elsewhere, in a UK economy rapidly losing its manufacturing base and its source of export income.
The implication is that the government always seeks to maintain the industry's profitability and have it located in London rather than see it migrate elsewhere. The strength afforded to the insurance industry by this position means that there is something akin to a parity of power between the government and the industry, rather than the latter being subservient to the former: an equality in power relations.
But the ABI cannot always rely on its members agreeing with each other -and some insurers are not members -and therefore developing a position the ABI can put forward with strength is not always easy. This situation is also complicated later in the Clearly the insurers want to avoid regulation and therefore this is one of their key aims when dealing with flood insurance. For instance, several of our interviewees mentioned the threat of regulation before the 1961 agreement and again in 2000, both pushing the industry (probably reluctantly) into some sort of informal agreement. They appear to have promoted a stable policy situation to avoid the possibility of tighter regulation at a time when they did not fully understand the risk they were insuring. As this understanding has increased, however, these same actors have sought incremental policy changes to try to push the UK government into spending more to reduce this risk, matching and using public reaction to the damaging floods as they occurred. Now that they better understand the risk insurers face the ABI has sought policy change for its members -or at least an end to the Statement of Principles -through the formalization of the cross-subsidy in a way that maintains the revenue stream from insuring those at virtually no risk. Any non-member or late joiners 'outside the coalition' are forced to comply, through the proposed legislation. It looks anti-competitive, and it probably is.
In A further group who might have had the role of policy entrepreneur are the independent researchers, perhaps in universities. However, with some notable exceptions (e.g. Ball et al., 2013; Crichton, 2007; Lamond et al., 2009; O'Neill & O'Neill, 2013; Priest, Clark, & Treby, 2005) there have been few researchers actively engaged in this field, unlike, for example, in policy fields such as education or health.
There has also been relatively little critique of the current arrangements, and certainly no academic policy entrepreneur has developed fundamentally new policy arrangements that have been acceptable to either government or the insurance industry.
In reality, therefore, the fundamental goals of the flood insurance policy and the actors supporting it have remained the same on both sides but they have gradually moved towards a more precise and formalised policy and relationship, and continue to do so as they agree on the new Flood-Re. The overall aim of the policy (i.e. to have risk-based pricing and broadly a market-based system, whilst maintaining availability and affordability in high risk areas) has probably stayed relatively constant. The dominant ideology and the core values of the two main players have not changed in the last 50 years: the role of the regulated private market has continued to be the dominant theme, supported by both the government and the insurers, in the only effective coalition that has existed (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993) . No significant other actors or policy entrepreneurs have emerged to challenge or change the situation. No significant policy review has been undertaken, except in negotiations behind closed doors, and the players active in the policy subsystem have therefore continued in much the same way as they always have done.
Policy 'windows'
The questions pertinent here are whether there is any evidence of key 'policy windows' There is no doubt that there have been events in the last 50 years which could have created windows for major policy change in the field of flood insurance, but the reality seems to have been that such windows as occurred were not particularly significant nor exploited by entrepreneurs or coalitions of actors seeking fundamental change. The events may have changed the nature of the debate, but they did not lead to fundamental policy change in the field of flood insurance; they had their influence elsewhere, not least in increasing FRM budgets, tightening spatial planning systems and improving information flow to the public (e.g. Johnson et al., 2005) .
But it is also clear that these events did have one other important effect: they reinforced the importance of the very existence of the extant system of flood insurance, to compensate victims and to allow the government to avoid itself paying compensation to those who had been flooded. The insurers made significant use of this 'window of opportunity' (Kingdon, 1995) , but this was not to promote change but to promote the merits of the status quo.
Assessment
The research reported here has deliberately aimed at examining a process of change which appears to be slow and incremental, to complement our previous research on catalytic processes of flood risk management policy evolution (Johnson et al., 2005; Johnson & Priest, 2008; Penning-Rowsell et al., 2006) . What we have observed is an institutional structure and a series of policy agreements which have shifted only at the margins over time but not changed fundamentally in the last six decades (summarized in Table 4 ). What we see here is an unchanging element of FRM policies through time, to set against the changing overall philosophy of moving from agricultural drainage through to FRM, and from a dominantly top-down approach driven by engineering to reduce the probability of flooding to elements of devolution and bottom-up activity aimed at addressing both the probability and the consequences of flood events. Table 4 should be inserted about here
The fundamental underpinning of government FRM policy -whatever it has been -by the private sector insuring against damage and allowing the public sector not to have to pay compensation should not be underestimated. This is why government has been so keen to obtain agreements with the insurance industry, which in turn has generally followed the ABI in presenting a united front in its negotiations. But there are many aspects of the process of incremental change that remain opaque, because a lack of transparency has been justified by 'commercial sensitivities'. Nevertheless we now understand more about the overall policy for managing flood risks in the UK than previously -although much remains still to be uncovered in detail.
What we have seen is that contextual factors dominate what policy change that there has been, and ideas of policy change that emphasise this appear most pertinent here.
In this respect what has been important has been, firstly, the threat to existing household insurers from new entrants unencumbered by agreements to insure allcomers. Secondly, the march of technological change has made exposure more explicit and pricing risk both easier and less expensive. The relatively stable role of the different actors and coalitions is now clearer, and we have seen that entrepreneurial activity has been minimal because the status quo has satisfied the main contenders: the government and the insurers. The many significant 'windows of opportunity' created by significant flooding or financial crisis have not significantly affected the pace or direction of policy change. The overriding importance of the profitability of the insurance industry -both to government and to the insurers themselves -is our explanation for the extraordinary policy stability that we have described.
The policy windows theory of policy change (Kingdon, 1995) is not negated by these interpretations, rather it appears not to be appropriate for this FRM measure: there were 'windows' but they did not lead to fundamental change. The coalition of government and insurers continued to advocate the same policies and there was virtually no criticism let alone opposition to this situation: the 'Coalition theory ' is therefore powerful not in explaining change by explaining the lack of change. At the same time "power elite" ideas are also useful: policy stability is assured by the ABI working with Defra and its Ministers to manage together the process of incremental change. Indeed, policy equilibrium is the norm in this context (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993) largely because there appears to be no competing coalition of actors seeking fundamental change (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993) , no groundswell of grassroot opposition (Alinsky, 1989) nor any fundamental change in the actors involved or the manner in which the flood insurance message has been framed (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) .
Conclusions and forward look
In this paper we have described, analysed and -we believe -explained the slow and incremental evolution of policy in this FRM field of flood insurance. We contrast this with our previous analysis of catalytic processes of change (Johnson et al., 2005) , and now see this slow process as also contrasting with the many profound UK societal changes that have occurred since the 1960s, affecting most areas of government intervention and insurance markets.
In contrast to many examples of flood insurance and compensation in other countries, the early introduction in the UK of a system of flood insurance purely provided by the private market appears to have been a critical component of the stability of the system. When the system was originally introduced the inability to accurately assess and price flood risk meant that any cross-subsidy was hidden and the system was considered acceptable to consumers, government and insurers alike. Technological (and data) advances mean that the context has fundamentally altered and insurers are now better able to assess flood risk, and understand their exposure. Their customers (and their government) can see much more clearly now the cross-subsidies involved, and the Flood-Re proposals seek to continue the pattern so well established in the past.
In many other countries this ability now to assess risk (and thereby more accurately to price that risk) is, we feel, likely to prevent the adoption of a private market system, or the high penetration of flood insurance where it is offered, because of the new clarity about cross-subsidy and the 'unfairness' that it exposes and the lack of the particular history on which our UK example is based.
The past is therefore crucial; what then of the future in the UK? Based on our analysis of the past, can we predict or at least suggest the path of future policy change?
In this respect, first, we would predict no fundamental shift in policy direction emanating from the current "understanding" in 2013. Flood insurance will continue to be dominated by the private sector, with government support but little apparent 'interference'. Secondly, the problem of cross-subsidy will not go away. With even greater transparency regarding risk, it will become increasingly clear that many
properties at high risk are uninsurable, at least at "affordable" premiums. A transition to full risk-based pricing will be painful for those who occupy these high risk areas, but eventually may create a disincentive for unwise floodplain occupancy. Thirdly, the main actors will continue to be the insurers represented by some trade organisation such as the ABI and the government, each with an interest fundamentally in maintaining the status quo.
Any failure of insurance per se will be "bailed out" by the government fearful of the consequences within the wider economy and concerned to retain London as the premier location for insurance internationally. These last forces are far more important than the intricacies of the flood insurance domain in the United Kingdom, while that remains reasonably profitable.
Explanatory Notes
1 Interviews were not possible with the government side of the discussions and negotiations, as most of those involved here have retired or decided they were unable to participate. The six interviews cover most aspects of the flood insurance industry, but this survey is limited to those with the greatest experience and is not seen as fully comprehensive.
2 10 shillings per £100 insured, which is £0.5 in post-1971 decimalisation currency.
3 One government official indicated to us that in the negotiations concerning the ending of the
Statement of Principles there had been as many as 20 meetings between government
Ministers and the ABI in the 10 months between September 2012 and June 2013. 4 The UK Government Flood Insurance Obligation included in the Water Bill 2013 would be invoked if Flood Re could not be implemented or subsequently if it failed to achieve its objectives. Defra (2013a, 6) suggest that this obligation would involve the UK Government regulating the insurance industry to ensure the "widespread availability" of "affordable" home insurance and requiring insurers to cover a quota of high risk households.  A sympathetic administration is in office  A strong group of allies with a common goal is in place or can be formed 3. "Policy Windows" or Agenda Setting (Kingdon, 1995) 
